

Message Text

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EXDIS -- DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

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SUBJECT: PREPARATION FOR LONDON TALKS

REF: STATE 173586

1. SUMMARY: I DISCUSSED LONDON TALKS WITH DAYAN JULY 11. HE ASKED IF U.S. PRESS SPOKESMAN WOULD PARTICIPATE IN MEETINGS. HE HOPED THAT SIX RATHER THAN FIVE ISRAELIS COULD PARTICIPATE IN ALL THE LONDON SESSIONS. HE ALSO REQUESTED THAT A STENOTYPYST TAKE THE OFFICIAL RECORD OF ALL THE TRILATERAL TALKS. DAYAN STRESSED THE DID NOT DESIRE A BILATERAL MEETING WITH KAMEL UNLESS "KAMEL REALLY WANTS IT." HE WONDERED WHETHER SECRETARY WAS SIGNALLING AT JULY 10 PRESS CONFERENCE ENTIRELY NEW SET OF PRINCIPLES WHICH U.S. WOULD PUT
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FORWARD. I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT NOT. HE STRESSED THERE WAS NO POINT IN DISCUSSING THE OFT EXAMINED DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AT LONDON BECAUSE HE WOULD HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE FURTHER CHANGES IN THE ISRAELI LANGUAGE; IF EGYPT WISHED, THIS COULD OCCUR AT A LATER MEETING. OTHER THAN THE ABOVE, HE WAS IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH OUR SUGGESTED SCHEDULE AND APPROACH. DAYAN SAID TALKS BEGINNING IN LATE JULY OR EARLY AUGUST IN EL ARISH WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO THE GOI. MOST IMPORTATN (AND FAMILIAR) QUESTION ISRAELIS WOULD BE ASKING KAMEL IN LONDON WAS WHETHER EGYPT WAS PREPARED TO

SIGN A PEACE TREATY CONCERNING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. WITH THIS PREOCCUPATION AS BACKDROP, DAYAN INDICATED HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION NOW TO SAY WHAT WOULD BE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT. HE SAID ISRAEL WAS TAKING THE JULY 18-19 MEETINGS SERIOUSLY BUT HE DOUBTED THAT SADAT WAS DOING THE SAME. HE WOULD BE SURPRISED IF KAMEL WAS IN A POSITION TO DO BUSINESS IN LONDON. SE COMMENT PARAS 21-27. END SUMMARY.

2. DRAWING ON REFTTEL, I DISCUSSED LONDON TALKS WITH DAYAN FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF ON JULY 11. ALSO PRESENT WERE EVRON, RUBINSTEIN AND BLACKWILL.

3. CAREFULLY WENT OVER OUR SUGGESTIONS ON HOW THE LONDON DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE ORGANIZED (PARAS 2-7 IN REFTTEL).

4. DAYAN FIRST RESPONDED WITH WHAT HE CALLED A TECHNICAL POINT. HE ASKED IF THE U.S. WOULD HAVE A PRESS SPOKESMAN AMONG ITS PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING. HE SAID IN ANY CASE THAT LAVIE, HIS SPOKESMAN, WOULD BE A MEMBER OF THE ISRAELI DELEGATION. HE THEN BEGAN TO COUNT THE ISRAELI PARTICIPANTS AND CAME UP SIX: DAYAN, DINITZ, BARAK, ROSENNE, RUBINSTEIN, AND LAVIE. HE THEREFORE HOPED THAT THESE SIX, RATHER THAN FIVE, COULD PARTICIPATE IN ALL THE LONDON
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MEETINGS, EXCEPT OF COURSE IN POSSIBLE MORE RESTRICTED GATHERINGS. (INCIDENTALLY, AFTER READING LONDON'S 10934 ABOUT SIZE OF SUITES, AND ALSO COUNTING LIKELY PARTICIPANTS ON U.S. SIDE, I DON'T SEE HOW THE 5-5-5 FORMAT WILL WORK IN ANY CASE.)

6. NEXT, PICKING UP MY POINT THAT WE WERE SUGGESTING TO EGYPTIANS THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE IF THERE COULD BE AT LEAST ONE BILATERAL MEETING BETWEEN KAMEL AND DAYAN, DAYAN STRESSED HE DID NOT DESIRE SUCH A SESSION UNLESS "KAMEL REALLY WANTS IT." IN NO WAY DID HE WISH WASHINGTON TO PUCH FOR A BILATERAL MEETING BETWEEN HIM AND KAMEL. "IF YOU HAVE THE FEELING HE IS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC, FORGET ABOUT IT. DON'T TWIST HIS ARM." I SAID I WOULD CONVEY THAT MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON, BUT IT SEEMED TO ME BETTER TO LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI BILATERAL AND SEE HOW THINGS WENT AT THE MEETING.

7. THE NEXT HAD AN EXTENDED DISCUSSION OF THE SECRETARY'S JULY 10 PRESS CONFERENCE. HE WAS PARTICULARLY CURIOUS ABOUT THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, "WE HAVE SAID THAT WE WOULD WISH TO SEE THOSE NEGOTIATIONS BROADENED IN THE FUTURE. THAT IS THE REASON THAT ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE MATTERS TO BE DISCUSSED AT LONDON IS THE FORMULATION OF A SET OF PRINICIPLES THAT COULD GOVERN A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN; OUR DISCUSSIONS ARE AIMED AT ACHIEVING A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST." WHAT, ASKED DAYAN, DID THAT MEAN?

I SAID THAT IF I UNDERSTOOD IT CORRECTLY, IN EFFECT THE LONDON MEETING WOULD BE A RECONSTITUTION OF THE JERUSALEM POLITICAL COMMITTEE. AFTER JANUARY, ROY ATHERTON'S TRIPS BACK AND FORTH TO THE AREA, DAYAN'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, THERE HAD BEEN FAIR PROGRESS ON A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. THAT DRAFT STILL EXISTS. IT WOULD BE ONE OF THE THREE DOCUMENTS TO BE CONSIDERED IN LONDON.

8. DAYAN IMMEDIATELY REACTED BY SAYING THAT HE DIDN'T BELIEVE
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WE SHOULD GO BACK NOW TO THE EFFORT OF REACHING A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. HE WAS MOST RELUCTANT TO BEGIN THAT EXERCISE AGAIN. HE DID NOT BELIEVE WE WOULD HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE FURTHER CHANGES IN THE ISRAELI LANGUAGE. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD CONSIDERED THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE, AND DAYAN WOULD NOT BE AUTHORIZED TO CHANGE ONE WORD OF THE LAST ISRAELI PROPOSAL WHICH WAS GIVEN TO THE U.S. IN WASHINGTON. DAYAN SAID THAT IF THAT LANGUAGE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT, HE WAS SORRY, BUT "THAT IS ALL THIS CABINET CAN DO." SO IT WOULD BE USELESS TO TRY TO AGAIN GO OVER THE PRINCIPLES "WORD BY WORD."

9. DAYAN CONTINUED THAT IN ADDITION TO THE LACK OF FURTHER ISRAELI FLEXIBILITY ON THE DRAFT PRINCIPLES, SUCH AN EMPHASIS IN LONDON WOULD VITIATE THE VALUE OF THE MEETING. THERE WERE TWO PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE. HE DID NOT MUCH LIKE THE EGYPTIAN PLAN, BUT IT DID GO INTO SOME

DETAIL. HE SAID HE WAS IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH OUR SUGGESTED APPROACH. THERE WERE QUESTIONS HE WISHED TO ASK AND HE WOULD ASK THEM. BUT THEY WOULD CONCERN THE CONCRETE PLANS IN QUESTION AND DEAL WITH SUBSTANCE. HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO EXPLAIN THE ISRAELI PLAN TO KAMEL. PERHAPS HE COULD GIVE "A DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION" TO THE PLAN IN THE WAY HE HAD DONE WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT. DAYAN SAID THAT WASHINGTON WANTED TO NARROW THE GAP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THAT WAS EXACTLY WHAT ISRAEL WANTED AS WELL. BUT THE DISCUSSION SHOULD CENTER ON THE DETAILS OF THE ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN PROPOSALS AND

LEAVE THE PRINCIPLES ASIDE.

10. DAYAN AGAIN RETURNED TO THE SECRETARY'S SENTENCES IN
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THE PRESS CONFERENCE. DID THE SECRETARY INTEND TO PUT FORWARD IN LONDON A NEW SET OF PRINCIPLES WHICH WOULD GOVERN A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT? IF SO, THAT WORRIED HIM. TO DAYAN COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT MEANT A SOLUTION FOR THE REFUGEE

PROBLEM AND THE INCLUSION OF SYRIA. NEITHER OF THOSE ISSUES WAS LIKELY TO BE SETTLED SOON. WAS THE SECRETARY DESCRIBING A NEW AMERICAN PROPOSAL?

11. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THE SECRETARY WAS SIMPLY RESTATING WHAT WE HAD SAID ALL ALONG. OUR EFFORTS FROM THE CAIRO CONFERENCE ONWARD HAD BEEN INTENDED TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A GENERAL DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES TO PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS LEADING EVENTUALLY TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT IN THE AREA. THAT HAD ALWAYS BEEN THE PURPOSE OF THE DRAFT PRINCIPLES. THEY WOULD PROVIDE THE FRAMEWORK FOR A PEACE TREATY WITH EGYPT, WHICH WOULD THEN IDEALLY BE FOLLOWED BY OTHER TREATIES WITH ISRAEL'S NEIGHBORS. I SAID I WOULD CHECK WITH WASHINGTON, BUT IT WAS MY IMPRESSION THAT THE SECRETARY WAS STATING THE FAMILIAR AND HAD NOTHING NEW OR DRAMATIC IN MIND; RATHER HIS PRESS CONFERENCE COMMENTS HAD REFERRED TO THE UNFINISHED EXERCISE OF THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. (PLEASE CONFIRM.)

12. STRESSING THAT WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS HIGHLY IMPORTANT THAT THE LONDON TALKS END WITH AGREEMENT THAT FURTHER DIRECT EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI CONTACTS TAKE PLACE, I ASKED DAYAN IF TALKS BEGINNING IN LATE JULY OR EARLY AUGUST IN EL ARISH WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO THE GOI. HE IMMEDIATELY SAID YES, "WE LIKE IT." HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE ISRAELIS DID NOT WANT IN ANY WAY TO PREJUDICE THE MILITARY COMMITTEE. IF MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS IN SIANI OR MILITARY SUBJECTS CONCERNING THE WEST BANK WERE TO BE DISCUSSED, THAT SHOULD BE DONE IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE. INDEED, THE TWO COMMITTEES COULD MEET IN THE SAME PLACE. DAYAN PARENTHETICALLY ADDED THAT THERE WOULD BE "NO PROBLEM" WITH ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS IN EL ARISH. THERE IS AN AIRPORT THERE WITH ADEQUATE FACILITIES
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FOR MEETINGS; AND ALL PRINCIPALS AND PARTICIPANTS COULD RETURN TO CAPITALS EVERY NIGHT. "GOOD RUNNING WATER" AND ELECTRICITY EXIST IN EL ARISH ALREADY, AND AIR CONDITIONING COULD BE PUT IN WHEN THE TPME COMES. IN SUM, EL ARISH WAS PRACTICAL FOR A MEETING PLACE FROM A PHYSICAL POINT OF VIEW.

13. RETURNING TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTERNATING MEETINGS BETWEEN EL ARISH AND BEERSHEVA, DAYAN SAID SADAT'S IDEA SEEMED TO BE THAT ONE SESSION WOULD TAKE PLACE IN EGYPTIAN TERRITORY AND ONE IN ISRAELI TERRITORY. BUT IF SADAT INSISTED ON EL ARISH ONLY, IT WAS STILL UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL. HE MAY CALL IT THE CAPITAL OF SINAI, HE MAY SEND ALONG WITH KAMEL WHATEVER MILITARY POLICE HE CHOOSES, BUT EL ARISH IS STILL UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL. IN ANY EVENT, DAYAN INDICATED THAT ISRAEL COULD ACCEPT EITHER ALTERNATING MEETINGS BETWEEN EL ARISH AND BEERSHEVA OR "JUST EL ARISH." (BEGIN MAY HAVE OTHER IDEAS, AND I WOULD ALSO NOTE THAT IF THE MEETINGS TAKE

PLACE ONLY AT EL ARISH, SADAT'S SYMMETRY AND SYMBOLISM WILL DISAPPEAR AND THE MEETING WILL SIMPLY OCCUR IN ISRAELI-OCCUPIED TERRITORY.)

14. REACTING TO MY QUESTION, DAYAN AGAIN CONFIRMED THAT HIS SCHEDULE WAS FREE IN LATE JULY AND EARLY AUGUST.

15. I THEN WENT OVER WHAT WE HOPED WOULD BE CONTAINED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT WHICH WOULD BE ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE LONDON MEETING. DAYAN RESPONDED THAT, "I SUPPOSE WE SHALL TAKE CARE NOT TO FIND OURSELVES IN A POSITION WHERE WE CANNOT CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS," BUT WE HAVE A SERIOUS QUESTION TO ASK THE EGYPTIANS. WHAT ARE WE DISCUSSING? WOULD EGYPT BE WILLING TO SIGN A PEACE TREATY CONCERNING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AS WELL AS ONE RELATING TO SINAI. OR
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WOULD THEY REFER ANY AGREEMENT TO GENEVA, TO THE JORDANIANS, OR TO SOMEWHERE ELSE? IF THEY CANNOT ANSWER THAT QUESTION POSITIVELY, THE ISRAELIS WILL HAVE TO ASK THEMSELVES, "WHAT IS GOING ON?" "WHAT HAVE WE BEEN DOING FOR THE PAST YEAR? WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE QUESTIONS THE ISRAELIS WERE ASKED?" WITH THIS AS BACKDROP, DAYAN CONTINUED THAT HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION JUST NOW TO SAY WHAT WOULD BE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN THE MEETING. EVENTS IN LONDON CERTAINLY WOULD INFLUENCE ISRAELI ATTITUDES TOWARD FOLLOW-ON MEETINGS.

16. I TOLD DAYAN THAT HIS QUESTION WAS A LOGICAL ONE, BUT IF SADAT HAD BEEN UNWILLING TO ANSWER IT THUS FAR, IT WAS UNLIKELY THA KAMEL WOULD BE MORE FORTHCOMING IN LONDON. I SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS THE ANSWER MIGHT COME OUT OF THE PROCESS. IT PROBABLY WOULD NOT APPEAR SUDDENLY AND DRAMATICALLY FROM THE EGYPTIANS AT THIS POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

17. I THEN STRESSED TO DAYAN THAT WE WERE MAKING CLEAR TO CAIRO THAT WE DID NOT SEE THE LONDON MEETING AS A PRO-FORMA EXERCISE. WE WANTED BUSINESS TO BE DONE THERE. WE WANTED THE TWO SIDES TO REINSTITUTE THE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS, AND TO KEEP THEM GOING.

18. DAYAN SAID QUITE A DIFFERENT MESSAGE WAS COMING FROM EGYPT. ONE COULD BE FORGIVEN FOR BELIEVING THAT SADAT WAS SIMPLY WAITING FOR THE LONDON MEETING TO FAIL IN ORDER TO

STIMULATE THE PRESENTATION OF AN AMERICAN PEACE PLAN TO BRIDGE THE IMPASSE. SADAT IS PAINTING THE LONDON SESSION AS AN UNIMPORTANT FIRST ACT "BEFORE THE REAL STUFF." MAYBE THIS WAS NOT AN ACCURATE PORTRAYAL OF THE EGYPTIAN POSITION, MAYBE DAYAN WAS SUSPICIOUS, BUT GIVEN THIS APPARENT VIEW IN CAIRO AND PERSONALITY OF KAMEL, HE COULD NOT HELP BEING PESSIMISTIC ABOUT LONDON. I THEN REITERATED OUR DEEPLY HELD

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VIEW THAT THE DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON WERE NO SHAM, WERE MEANT TO PUSH THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD, WERE NOT DESIGNED TO BE A PENULTIMATE ACT BEFORE AMERICAN INTERVENTION.

19. IN CONCLUDING THE CONVERSATION, I ASKED DAYAN IF THERE WERE WAYS WE HAVE NOT THOUGHT OF THAT THE U.S. COULD BE HELPUFUL IN MAKING SURE THAT THE LONDON MEETINGS WERE A SUCCESS. HE PLEADED THAT WE SHOULD CONVINCE THE EGYPTIANS TO BE BUSINESSLIKE, TO AVOID RHETORIC, AND TO STAY AWAY FROM THE PRESS. HE HOPED THAT KAMEL WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE SIX POINTS OF THE EGYPTIAN PLAN AND A DEEPER EXAMINATION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. DAYAN SAID, "WE MUST FIND OUT WHAT CAN BE DONE."

20. AS WE WERE PREPARING TO GO, DAYAN RETURNED AGAIN TO THE SUBJECT OF KAMEL. HE DOUBTED IF KAMEL WAS IN A POSITION TO DO BUSINESS IN LONDON. DAYAN SAID HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO DO MUCH BUSINESS EITHER, BUT IF ON THE SPUR OF THE MOMENT SOMETHING COULD BE ACHIEVED, THEN HE WOULD GO HOME AND TRY TO SELL IT TO BEGIN. HE HAD FULL AUTHORITY TO EXPLORE ANY ASPECTS OF THE TWO PROPOSALS. ON AN AD REFERENDUM BASIS. HE WONDERED IF KAMEL WAS IN A SIMILAR POSITION. I COUNSELLED DAYAN TO EXPRESS THESE CONCERNS TO THE SECRETARY IN THEIR BILATERAL TALKS THE FIRST MORNING OF THE LONDON MEETINGS.

21. ELI RUBINSTEIN TELEPHONED ME THIS MORNING, JULY 12, TO CONVEY ON BEGIN'S AND DAYAN'S BEHALF A FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF THEIR POSITION CONCERNING THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES EXERCISE. HE SAID THAT IF THE EGYPTIANS WISH, THE GOI WOULD BE READY TO RETURN TO NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE DECLARATION - BUT NOT RIGHT NOW AT LONDON. RATHER, THIS SHOULD OCCUR AT A SUBSEQUENT MEETING CONVENED FOR THIS PURPOSE, AT WHICH, OF
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COURSE, THE U.S. SHOULD PARTICIPATE.

22. COMMENT: DAYAN EMPHASIZED SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE MEANS IT WHEN HE SAYS HE IS APPROACHING THE LONDON MEETING SERIOUSLY. I BELIEVE THAT HE HOPES TO FIND A LITTLE COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS, DESPITE HIS SHARP PUBLIC CRITICISM OF IT. BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT HE HAS NEARLY CONCLUDED THAT THE EGYPTIAN APPROACH TO LONDON WILL MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO GET INTO A REAL DISCUSSION THERE. IF HE IS RIGHT, WITHOUT QUESTION THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT WILL PARTIALLY BLAME WASHINGTON FOR THIS EGYPTIAN RIGIDITY SINCE IT IS A TRUISM HERE THAT EGYPT AND THE U.S. SHARE THE SAME OBJECTIVE OF GETTING AN AMERICAN PEACE PLAN ON THE TABLE IN THE NEAR

FUTURE.

23. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE EGYPTIANS ARE PREPARED TO SIGN A PEACE TREATY CONCERNING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP HAS GAINED PRIORITY OF POSITION HERE. THE ISRAELIS ARE HONESTLY FRUSTRATED WITH SADAT'S UNWILLINGNESS TO COMMIT HIMSELF ON THIS MATTER, AND ALSO PROBABLY SEE SOME PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE TO BE GAINED BY POINT OUT THAT EGYPT IS READY TO NEGOTIATE BUT NOT TO SIGN.

24. I AM NOT SURE HOW TO EXPLAIN DAYAN'S LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR SEEING KAMEL ALONE. GIVEN HIS EXPERIENCE AT THE JANUARY JERUSALEM TALKS, HE SEEMS CONVINCED IT WOULD SIMPLY BE A WASTE OF TIME. HE MAY ALSO WISH TO HAVE A WITNESS PRESENT WHEN TALKING TO KAMEL TO PROTECT HIMSELF AGAINST SUBSEQUENT EGYPTIAN BACKGROUNDEERS. IT IS CERTAINLY TRUE HE HAS NO RESPECT FOR KAMEL WHATEVER. BUT HE DID NOT CLOSE THE DOOR ENTIRELY AND IF THERE IS ANY MOVEMENT AT ALL IN LONDON, I WOULD GUESS WE CAN PERSUADE HIM TO TALK TO KAMEL WITHOUT US BEING PRESENT - BUT ONLY IF KAMEL SHOWS SOME INTEREST HIMSELF IN SUCH A MEETING.

25. I DO NOT TAKE TOO SERIOUSLY DAYAN'S IMPLIED THREAT
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TO STOP TALKING TO THE EGYPTIANS IF LONDON IS A BUST. DIRECT DISCUSSIONS HAVE BEEN A LITANY HERE FOR DECADES, AND THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT WILL NOT WANT TO BE BLAMED FOR SEVERING THE BILATERAL CORD WITH EGYPT. THAT IS ESPECIALLY TRUE A FEW DAYS AFTER THE SADAT-PERES MEETING IN VIENNA.

26. FINALLY, DAYAN'S INSISTENCE THAT LONDON NOT DEAL WITH THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES RELECTS TWO ELEMENTS. AS HE TOLD US IN WASHINGTON IN LATE APRIL, HE SEES NO CHANCE OF FURTHER FLEXIBILITY FROM BEGIN ON THE SENSITIVE KEY PHRASES AT ISSUE UNTIL THERE IS REAL PROGRESS TOWARD AGREEMENT ON CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A WEST BANK/GAZA REGIME. EVEN MORE IMPORTANT AT THIS MOMENT IS THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT HERE FROM THE PERES-SADAT MEETING IN VIENNA, AND THE "DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES" PRODUCED BY BRANDT AND KRIESKY. BEGIN AND DAYAN ARE SEETING AT PERES FOR BEING ABLE TO GET AT SADAT WHEN THEY CANNOT; THE PM'S OFFICE IS PLANNING STRATEGY TO CUT PERES UP POLITICALLY FOR USURPING THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN NEGOTIATIONS; AND WE ARE UNDOUBTEDLY SUSPECTED AS BEING SOMEHOW BEHIND THE WHOLE DRAMA. TO DISCUSS THE DECLARATION AT LONDON WOULD BE SEEN HERE RIGHT NOW AS BEGIN/DAYAN MEEKLY ACCEPTING PERES' NEGOTIATING LEAD-AN IMPRESSION THEY ARE HARDLY READY TO GIVE.

27. I REALIZE THIS ALL PROBABLY COMPLICATES OUR LONDON STRATEGY - BUT WE WILL HAVE TO TAKE DAYAN SERIOUSLY ON THIS ONE. IF WE INSIST ON ADDRESSING THE DECLARATION IN LONDON,

DAYAN WILL SIMPLY STONEWALL - AND TIME FOR OTHER MATTERS
WILL BE WASTED.
LEWIS

UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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